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16 December 1963

Briefly Noted

Cuba's Sugar-Coated Economic Chaos

Although there have been complaints that the economic boycott against Cuba is hurting the trade of some free countries, for others it is a blessing in disguise. The election of Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies has been attributed in part to the sudden increase in prosperity in the sugar-producing territory of Queensland. With most of Cuba's sugar going to Communist Bloc countries, and international quotas no longer in force, Queensland has increased the production of sugar from 1,400,000 tons in 1961 to 1,950,000 in 1963, with the prospect of raising this to 2,135,000 tons in 1964. In fact, all sugar-producing countries of the free world have profited by the present Cuban-created situation, selling more sugar and at higher prices -- up to 11 cents U.S. per pound. Cuba, on the other hand, as a result of Castro's wildly erratic economic policies, is producing less sugar and selling it at lower prices. Under a bi-lateral barter agreement, Cuba is exporting 1,000,000 tons of sugar to the Soviet Union in 1963. Of this total, 80% will be exchanged for other goods at the rate of 6 cents per pound, and 20% will be sold for hard currency at 4 cents per pound. All sugar that Cuba exports to other bloc countries is exchanged for barter at 6 cents per pound.

We do not wish to present the above in such a way as to make it look as though the sugar-producing countries of Latin America, for example, are profiting by the misfortune of the Cuban people. However, Cuba's economic plight today serves as a good case history of how Communist mismanagement can bring economic ruin to the most prosperous country. Further, in the market vacuum created by Cuba, other sugar-producing countries of the world are building vested interests in increased production. Therefore, if Cuba continues to pursue its present Communist-dictated economic policies -- which it undoubtedly will do as long as Castro is in power -- it stands a good chance of losing its old sugar markets permanently.

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(Briefly Noted)

DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST

January L.A. Trade Union Fed. Constituent Cong. (WFTU sponsored) Rio de Janeiro, Jan. 1934.

2 Jan Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba 1959 (fifth anniversary).

21 Jan Lenin dies, 1924 (40th anniversary) (born 22 April 1870) see BPD item 709 of 4 November

23 Jan Second Congress of Soviets meets: Stalin swears allegiance to Lenin's policies, 1924.

31 Jan Leon Trotsky banished for life, 1929 (35th anniv.)

31 Jan Cuban Marxist-Leninist Government excluded from participation inter-American system by Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este, 1962.

1 Feb UNGA adopts resolution charging Chinese Communists aggression in Korea, 1951.

14 Feb USSR and CPR sign treaty of alliance (Sino-Soviet Friendship Pact) repudiating Soviet Nationalist Treaty (14 August 1945), 1950.

14 Feb Khrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech at CPSU 20th Congress, 14-25 Feb. 1956.

24 Feb Treaty of Ili (or St. Petersburg) returning most of Sinkiang territory to China but granting portion to Russia, 1881.

25 Feb Soviets imprison leader of Smallholders' Party, Bela Kovacs, in campaign to destroy major anti-Communist opposition, Hung. 1947.

26 Feb International Conference of Youth and Students for Disarmament, Peace and National Independence (WFDY-sponsored), Florence, Italy, 26 Feb-1 Mar 1963.

27 Feb Mao Tse-tung delivers "Hundred Flowers" speech, 1957.

March Latin American Youth Congress (Communist-sponsored) Santiago, Chile, 1964.

2 Mar "Trial of the 21" charging attempt to restore capitalism by Bukharin, Rykov and Yagoda et al, (12 sentenced to death) 2-13 March 1938.

5 Mar Joseph Stalin dies (born 21 Dec 1879), 1953.

8 Mar February Revolution (Julian Cal. 23 Feb-2 Mar) 8-15 March 1917.

13 Mar Chinese Communist attempt to arrest Tibetan Dalai Lama, 1959.

14 Mar Karl Marx dies (born 5 May 1818), 1883.

15 Mar Kronstadt Uprising crushed (started 23 Feb), 1921.

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Dictionary of Dissensions in the Communist Camp

A reference of continuing interest treating the basic issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Innate Communist problems, as exposed by the principals themselves, are presented in alphabetical order: a succinct explanation of each issue is juxtaposed with the conflicting stands of Moscow and Peking arranged in a parallel column. This Primer of the Sino-Soviet Conflict (unclassified) is an authoritative source for all concerned with international as well as domestic Communist dissensions. A classified version, Issues and Slogans of



The Dictionary is a "must" for every scholar and propagandist. Available on request from Headquarters.

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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#18

23 November - 6 December 1963

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. The struggle in world Communism during this period focused on Warsaw, where representatives of the major parties fought a bitter, mutually damaging, 5-day battle before more than 400 delegates from 30-some countries assembled for a meeting of the World Peace Council: see detailed account in Chronology, November 20-December 2. The Soviets succeeded in marshaling an overwhelming majority in support of their position on peace, capitalizing particularly on their popular initiative on the test-ban treaty, -- with only the Chinese, Albanians, North Koreans, North Vietnamese, and Japanese in opposition. (The Indonesians made speeches on the Chinese side but failed to follow through with their votes.) However, the nature of the bitter recriminations, the refusal of the dissenters to accept the majority declaration and the absence of many delegates from the voting make the value of this Soviet "victory" rather doubtful.

2. Meanwhile, the official Rumanian acceptance of Yugoslavia as a full-fledged socialist state, spelled out in a joint communique which concerned economic agreements for the most part (Chrono, Nov. 30), tended further to counter Chinese efforts to stigmatize "the Tito clique."

3. While the Chinese press continued to carry "routine" polemical materials and press reports supporting their line, the Soviet press continued to play down the dispute: in fact, the first Soviet mention of Chinese obstructiveness and attacks at the WPC meeting came in Pravda and Izvestiya articles on December 3, after its conclusion. A 9,000-word Pravda article on the 3rd anniversary of the 31-party Moscow conference (Chrono, Dec. 6) -- although it calls in calm language for discussion of controversial questions in "the normal channel of inter-party relations" and an end to open polemics "to create more favorable conditions for the convocation of a new conference" -- seems like a throw-back to the 30 March CPSU letter to the CCP. It implies that it is up to the Chinese (without ever naming them) to restore unity by correcting their erroneous views and refraining from their harmful activities!

4. Reports (by NCNA) from Melbourne and Colombo indicate that pro-Chinese dissidents in Australia and Ceylon are moving closer to the establishment of organized parties. (Chrono, November 23, December 3 and 4).

5. The highly heretical article by Landin in the Swedish

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Ny Dag of November 9, described in our last installment, has been followed up by three further letters, one of which expresses partial agreement, while the other two, including one by veteran Party boss Hagber, rebut without engaging in any personal attack. (Appendix to Chronology and unclassified attachment. Note: translations of these articles were carried in the following numbers of the series Translations on International Communist Developments; the Nov. 9 article in No. 536, JPRS: 22,100 dtd 3 December 1963; and the three comments on it in No. 541, JPRS 22,262 dtd 13 December. The latter report also carries another interesting article by Hagberg from Ny Dag of 14 December, entitled "World Conference, But The Time Is Not Yet Ripe.")

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Significance:

There has been no further reliable information regarding prospects for Sino-Soviet bilateral talks or a world Communist meeting, but the developments at the Warsaw WPC meeting might be taken as a possible clue to the future. Here the Soviets found the most favorable conditions they might ever expect for an international conference (infact, the Chinese delegation alone voted against the resolution for holding the Warsaw meeting when the WPC Presidium met in Vienna, 27-29 Sept. according to a report in the Indian CP weekly New Age on 13 Oct.), i.e.:

- a. Of all the issues in dispute, the Soviet position is by far the strongest and most popular on "peace," especially since the opposition to the test-ban treaty and their attack on the Indian border;
- b. The WPC "apparat" has depended heavily on Soviet financial support; and
- c. The meeting was held in "friendly" (to the Soviets) territory.

Nevertheless, the Soviets, torn between their desire to bring the dissenters to heel and their need to maintain at least a semblance of unity, were unable to maintain their absolute control over the WPC and had to be satisfied with a statement accepted only by a majority, while the Chinese divulged to the world the texts of the two minority statements and the score of the voting.

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
We can conclude from the lessons of the Warsaw WPC meeting and other recent developments (e.g. the resolution of the Italian CP, COMMENTARY #15 and BPG #717) that the chances for a new world conference of all Communist Parties are very dim indeed -- unless the Soviets would capitulate, in fact, before the peremptory demands of Peking. Apparently the two contestants cannot even agree on the rules for the contest: the Chinese insist on unanimity for all decisions, the Soviets on majority votes. Moreover, at such a conference, the Chinese -- focusing their arguments on world revolution, national liberation movements etc. -- would be in a much better position than at the WPC meeting where their rejection of the test ban treaty cast them into a most difficult role.

We, therefore, assume that Moscow can restore any working unity of the WCM on terms acceptable to the present Kremlin leadership only if the Soviets either

- a. return to Stalinist methods of discipline, by using military force, kidnappings, assassinations etc. against Communist dissenters; or
- b. abandon the increasingly meaningless fetish of "international proletarian solidarity," acknowledge that they pursue objectives (both domestic and international) basically different from those of the Chinese and reorganize a new international alliance on their terms, eliminating the Chinese and their followers.

Since neither development is likely in the foreseeable future, we do not expect a genuine restoration of unity in the WCM, at least for the time being.

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#18

23 November-6 December 1963

November 23 - An Mongolian Party organ Unen editorial reiterates full support of the CPSU and denounces the "adventurists and opportunists, crudely distorting truth... (and) attempting... to discredit the great Marxist-Leninist doctrine." Every M-L party must "give a crushing blow to the dogmatists, sectarians, and other apostates."

November 24 - Peking press quotes extensively from the Albanian Zeri I Popullit 9 November denunciation of Tito, Khrushchev and company.

November 25 - Peking papers give front-page prominence to a conference of the Department of Philosophy and Social Science of the Chinese Academy of Sciences -- under the self-explanatory heading "Oppose Modern Revisionism, Study Contemporary Revolutionary Questions." Peking press also features a resolution of the CP of New Zealand reiterating its stand that revisionism is the main danger to the movement. The French and Belgian CPs simultaneously publish a joint communiqué strongly denouncing the Peking line and urging that steps be taken to convene and insure the success of a conference of world Communist parties which would "reaffirm the general line of the International Communist movement in the light of new developments." (AFP)

November 26 - Peking press prominently plays a press release of the Indonesian CP's CC featuring Chairman Aidit's remarks in a 12 November speech in Djakarta: he called for continuing efforts to "crush" revisionism, "a poison which weakens the anti-imperialist struggle," and pointed out that "armed struggle remains a salient feature of the people's struggle in the southeast Asian countries."

November 27 - All Chinese papers feature an article from the December issue of the monthly literary journal Wen Yi Pao (The Literary Gazette) (published the 26th) which criticized as revisionist three recent Soviet films and some statements made by their director, G. Chunkhrai. "The smell of bourgeois humanitarianism and pacifism spread by the films shows, in the field of art and ideology, precisely the political line of modern revisionism and the political demand for peaceful evolution from socialism to capitalism."

November 28 - People's Daily (and other Peking press) publishes an 11 November "Declaration of Australian Marxist-Leninists," with an editor's note explaining that it is a reply of E.F. Hill and other comrades to the attack and vilification by the open letter of the CC/CPSU." The (Chinese) editor continues: "It can be clearly seen from this reply that it is none other than the CPSU leaders who have actually violated the principles guiding relations of the fraternal parties and adopted extremely foul methods in imposing a revisionist line on a fraternal party, interfering in its internal affairs, attacking the Marxist-Leninists with the party, and creating an internal split in it."

The Declaration itself gives a historical account of developments in "the deep-seated plot" of the CPSU leaders "to subvert the CPA to the line of the modern revisionists," in the course of which they "tried alternately to intimidate, bribe, and flatter the leaders of the CPA." It contrasts the capitulation to the CPSU's campaign by Sharkey and Dixon with "Hill's brilliant record of almost 30 years service of the Australian working class."

November 23-December 2 - The Warsaw meeting of the World Peace Council brought another round of bitter, open clashes between the Chinese challengers and the Soviet-aligned majority, -- before an assemblage reported (by Tass: sessions were barred to the press) to consist of "close to 450" delegates from more than 30 countries, and also representatives of 13 international organizations. Trouble broke out early in the first session: here is NCNA's account --

Jacques Madaule, a French Catholic..., lauded the assassinated President of the U.S., John F. Kennedy, and paid "respects" to him for his "good will."... He even proposed that all stand up to observe a moment's silence in memory of Kennedy....The proposal was dictated by a handful of people and imposed on the meeting as a surprise attack carefully thought out and arranged in advance. It was an attempt to glorify the bosses of U.S. imperialism in the name of the meeting....

A Chinese delegate, Tan Ming-chao, at once indignantly voiced his opposition to the proposal and asked for the floor to protest against this shameful move. But the executive chairman of the session, Ostap Dluski of Poland, turned down his legitimate request. Thereupon, delegates from China, Vietnam, Korea, Japan, Indonesia, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Albania, and some European countries sat still and refused to observe the silence. Some other delegations who had learned of the move in advance left the meeting hall before the proposal.

After prolonged consultations, the executive chairman finally agreed that Tang Ming-chao speak briefly at the session....T. said: "We would not be sincere to all the friends taking part in this meeting, nor would we be honest to ourselves, if we do not raise our voice in protest against the proposal to pay tribute suddenly imposed on us in a prepared speech...."

The delegates in the hall listened quietly and seriously to his statement. His suggestion that the meeting pay tribute to the martyrs who fell in the fight against U.S. imperialism drew loud applause. Delegates from many countries walked up to the Chinese delegate to praise and greet him. The U.S. delegates, first of all, shook hands with him and

other Chinese delegates with great warmth. They exclaimed in one voice: "Your statement is excellent."

NCNA further reported that the Japanese and N. Vietnamese delegations protested the move in written statements to the presidium the following day. On Dec. 1st, the N. Korean delegation chief in a speech denounced the move as "a disgrace to the WPC, and an indelible stain on the peace movement."

The Chinese speaker on the afternoon of the opening day, Liao Cheng-chih, delivered a hard 5,000-word exposition of the Chinese line, including a denunciation of the "certain persons" who viciously assail and libel all those who do not agree with their erroneous line and who have recently "gone so far as to make use of the name of the WPC Secretariat, the WPC Bulletin, the WPC delegations, etc., and even of a forged letter allegedly from the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace in an all-out assault on the Chinese people's just stand on defending world peace."

Among other speakers on the 29th was Spano of Italy, who, according to NCNA, "acted as an apologist for the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression and war, while distorting and attacking the stand taken by the Chinese delegation for world peace." He was followed by the Indian delegate, Arora, who "actually used the platform for world peace to make political provocations against China over the Sino-Indian border issue....All these remarks were astonishingly similar to the themes of Moscow."

After group discussions on 29 and 30 November, the plenary sessions resumed on 1 December, when, according to NCNA,

"the delegates of Korea, Albania, Vietnam and Indonesia held aloft the banner of opposing imperialism and defending world peace, denounced as a fraud the tripartite partial test-ban treaty, and censured the modern revisionists for their ignoble actions of prettifying and submitting to imperialism. The delegates of France, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, acting on orders of the baton, advanced lame excuses to defend the Moscow tripartite treaty and justify the modern revisionists' actions of begging imperialism for peace. By name or by insinuation, they attacked China and other defenders of world peace."

The Bulgarian delegate Pirinsky, according to NCNA, "slandered the position of China, Korea and Albania" on the Moscow treaty, and "what was most absurd,...went so far as to say that the treaty was 'signed by Chiang Kai-shek' because China did not sign it. His statement aroused indignation and sneers among the delegates."

The stormy discussions and voting of the final session are described by NCNA as follows:

The WPC meeting closed...having witnessed a bitter conflict between the line of safeguarding world peace by firmly opposing imperialism and the line of submitting to imperialism and begging it for peace.

At the closing session, the Chinese delegation declared that it did not approve the draft general document of the session submitted by the Presidium and put forward its own draft. The Chinese draft won warm support of the Korean, Albanian and Vietnamese delegations and some other delegates....The Japanese delegation (also) put forward its draft general document....

Swinging its baton, the Soviet delegation stage-managed an anti-China scandal. When the deputy leader of the Chinese delegation, Liu Ning-i, mounted the platform to read out the Chinese draft general document, the Soviet delegates took the lead in banging the desks and making catcalls. A number of their followers chimed in and added to the noise. This hooliganism aroused disgust among the majority of the delegates, and the executive chairman, James Endicott of Canada, had to pound his hammer heavily on the table to stop it....

The (Presidium's) draft appeal was adopted by the session with 42 delegates voting against it, 4 abstaining, and 292 for it. The Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, Albanian, and Japanese delegations and a number of other delegates from Asia, Africa and Latin America voted against it.

The Chinese draft was voted down with 38 for it, 18 abstaining, and 230 against it. Twenty delegates voted for the Japanese draft, 205 against it, and 21 abstaining.

A number of delegates and observers were absent from all three votings.

November 30 - The joint Rumanian-Yugoslav communique on the talks held during Rumanian boss Gheorghiu-Dej's 3-day state visit to Yugoslavia left no doubt about Rumania's acceptance of Yugoslav socialism. "Appreciating the important results achieved by the two countries in building socialism, the delegations expressed the opinion that the development of bilateral relations agreed with the interests of the two socialist countries and that proximity offers great possibilities for broadening this cooperation." It also lined up both on a common foreign policy line: "Analyzing the international situation, the delegations noted with satisfaction the identity or similarity of views on basic international questions, such as safeguarding peace...."

December 3 - Peking press carries a Colombo report of "the 17

November meeting of 37 Marxist-Leninists of the Ceylon CP, at which they decided to convoke the Seventh Congress of the Party to rid it of the deadweight of revisionism." People's Daily prints full text (and all other papers a summary) of the meeting's declaration "To All Marxist-Leninists Inside The Ceylon CP."

An Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial denounces, under the heading "Another Shameful Genuflection by Nikita Khrushchev," the Soviet Government's apologetic capitulation to the Adoula Government's decision to declare all Soviet Embassy personnel in Leopoldville personae non gratae. "In short, Khrushchev on this occasion again followed the teachings of Christ: when struck on one cheek, turn the other." ZIP goes on to compare "this opportunistic attitude of the Khrushchev group toward imperialism and its lackeys with its hostile attitude toward socialist Albania."

December 4 - A Peking People's Daily editorial on the closing of the CPN National People's Congress session added some new detail to Chinese charges of damage to their economy caused by the Soviet cut-back in aid: it says that in July 1960 Moscow abruptly withdrew 1,390 experts, tore up 343 contracts, annulled 257 scientific and technical agreements, and "heavily slashed the supply of whole sets of equipment and crucial parts of installations."

The Chinese press also carries an article reporting the publishing of a new theoretical journal, The Australian Communist, by "the Marxist-Leninists in Australia." The introduction to the first issue states that "the leaders of the CPA have deserted M-L and embarked upon the path of revisionism....Our journal will hold high the banner of M-L." E.F. Hill is author of a feature article entitled 'Democratic Centralism and Revisionism."

An article in the December issue of the East German Deutsche Auszenpolitik (German Foreign Policy) reaffirms the GDR's commitment to the Soviet line. "The policy of peaceful coexistence created the most essential prerequisites for the accomplishment of political independence by over 50 countries in this period and for the fact that those countries today play an active role in world politics. Only dogmatists who are estranged from life can ignore these facts."

December 5 - East European diplomats were reported (UPI, London) as describing a CPSU circular to all Bloc parties which warned that Moscow would not allow Peking to "jeopardize" the Soviet position in the Middle East and Africa. This coincided with reports that Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen I are planning to visit Cairo and a number of other African capitals.

December 6 - Pravda's 9,000-word lead editorial, "For the Unity and Solidarity of the International Communist Movement," pegged to the third anniversary of the 31-party Moscow conference, is written in a bland style, with little indication of the bitter

recriminations, insults and provocations of the past year. Like the CPSU letter to the CCP of 30 March, it is largely an exaltation of Soviet policy (the 1960 Moscow Declaration interpreted in accordance with Soviet views) as the "general line" of the movement, the correctness of which is demonstrated by the magnificent successes achieved. "The Soviet Union is successfully carrying out a majestic program of Communist construction which is exerting an immense revolutionizing influence on the minds of people throughout the world." This confident, generalized, argument-by-assertion continues throughout the first 30% of the verbiage.

Finally, however, the editorial admits that there is some "serious concern in connection with the open polemic which has begun within the Communist movement, during which the radical principles of the Declaration and Statement, which have been tested by life itself, have been subjected to doubt." But, after acknowledging that the "disagreements" are of a serious nature and the "open polemics have gone too far and in many cases have overstepped the norms of relationship between fraternal parties," Pravda says that "one must not over-dramatize the situation or regard it as irreparable." As Lenin taught, disagreements "are often resolved by a practical transition of those who have engaged in wrong reasoning onto the correct path of the struggle under the pressure of the trend of events itself."

Pravda recalls previous CPSU proposals for terminating polemics and solving the controversial issues by bilateral talks and conferences of the parties and proposes such steps again. It then states four "theses formulated in the Declaration and Statement (which) are obligatory for all Communist parties" and summarizes their meaning as follows:

To observe in deeds these principles which are binding for each Communist party means to refrain from fighting against fraternal parties who have taken up the positions of the Declaration and Statement, to refrain from making substitutions in the common general line, from conducting factional activities; not to support the splitters who have embarked upon the road of imposters declaring their groups, big and small, to be "revolutionary" parties, but to fight them resolutely.

An editorial on the same anniversary and date in the North Korean Rodong Sinmun is a hardline polemic for the Chinese line, with harsh denunciation of the "capitulationist, treacherous," modern revisionists who "concede to the imperialists rashly and grovel before them."

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Appendix to Chronology

Installment #17 of our Chronology (20 Nov.) described a heretical article in the Swedish CP daily NY DAG by a prominent Party figure, Sven Landin, rejecting the Moscow Declaration of 1960 and advocating reconstitution of the CP. The text of the Landin statement actually appeared on November 9, and, of three further communications commenting on it, one appeared on the 13th and two on the 19th. One of the latter was by the Party Chairman, Hilding Hagberg, the other by Stig Martinsson. H. agrees with several of Landin's points and "registers a dissenting opinion" on others: the other two rebut Landin but refrain from any personal attack. (In #15 we described an earlier critical letter carried by My Dag on October 15.)

Because the publication and discussion of such heretical views and basic criticisms in a Communist Party organ is unique, we are providing in an attachment translations of the full texts of these four relatively brief communications.

720. International Communist Support for Viet Cong.

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BACKGROUND: After the new government came into power in South Vietnam the United States reaffirmed its policy toward that country and toward the Geneva Accords of 1954, which were to have brought peace to that country after the Indonesian war. President Kennedy said:

"The United States, like the Republic of Vietnam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and our primary purpose is to help the South Vietnamese people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Vietnam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Vietnam, the measures we are taking to assist South Vietnam's defense efforts will no longer be necessary."

The struggle of the people of South Vietnam for their independence and freedom has been particularly sharp since 1959-1960 when the Viet Cong (Communist) guerrillas, having failed to win their objective of subjugating South Vietnam by propaganda and persuasion, began to resort openly to the use of terror on a wide scale.

Fraudulent Front. In September 1960 the Lao Dong (Communist) Party Congress in Hanoi set forth two tasks for its members:

"To carry out the Socialist Revolution in North Vietnam and to liberate South Vietnam for the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete freedom and independence."

The Communist leaders in North Vietnam called for the formation of a "broad national united front directed against the U.S. Diem clique" and three months later Hanoi Radio announced the creation of the "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" (NFLSV) -- in Hanoi. This is the organization, formed so obediently on the instructions of the North Vietnamese Communists, that international Communist propaganda depicts as having been established and directed by the people of South Vietnam. Recently, the International Communist Movement has made moves to gain wider official recognition for the NFLSV. According to an announcement by Radio Hanoi on 27 October, the NFLSV is in the process of setting up a permanent delegation in Prague similar to those that already exist in Havana and Algiers. These delegations pose as the authentic representatives of the people of South Vietnam and attempt to rally support for subversive activities against the Republic of South Vietnam.

 (720. Continued)

Guerrilla Units Entrenched. Under the cover of this spurious organization, the North Vietnamese Communists control related organizations and the Viet Cong expand their infiltration systems into the south and modernize their communications systems. Individual agents and Communist cell members, who had been told to stay in place and lead normal lives after the signing of the Geneva Accords, were activated and began to carry out assignments on instructions from their party leaders in North Vietnam. After the Geneva Accords went into effect, most of the military units that supported Ho Chi-minh moved to North Vietnam but some of the best-trained guerrilla units simply moved to remote and inaccessible regions in South Vietnam. After 1959 these units were returned to action as the hard core of the Viet Cong's terrorist activities and received, from the North Vietnamese regime, increased support in manpower and equipment. The Ho regime has shown that it is ready to allocate every resource that can be spared -- personnel, funds, or equipment -- to the cause of imposing communism on South Vietnam. The Lao Dong Party provides political guidance to Viet Cong agents responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, and propaganda. Significantly, most Viet Cong propaganda leaflets carry the hammer-and-sickle emblem of the Lao Dong Communists.

Hanoi Establishes Organization for Aggression. Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam have the backing of an elaborate organizational structure in North Vietnam. Overall direction of the Viet Cong movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party which has set up a special "Committee for Supervision of the South." For administrative purposes the Viet Cong divide South Vietnam into two zones: Interzone of South-Central Vietnam (Interzone 5), including the highlands and coastal regions of central Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel; and Interzone of the Nambo Region consisting of the southern and southwestern provinces (including the Mekong area). Each of the two zones is divided into four administrative regions of three to nine provinces each. Beneath this level, the Viet Cong structure is based on the administrative organization of the Republic of Vietnam and Party units are maintained at the provincial district, village and hamlet levels.

The authorities in North Vietnam have gone to elaborate lengths to conceal their activity, to deny their direct participation in the program to conquer and absorb South Vietnam, and to propagate the fiction that the armed subversion in South Vietnam is an internal matter. To help conceal the identity of agents going into the South, a special section of the intelligence service produces false identification papers, forged shipping registration certificates, draft cards and other documents. However, no effort at concealment carried out on such a large scale can be completely successful. Some Viet Cong agents have defected and some have been captured. Published data from these and other sources provide a fairly detailed picture of what the Viet Cong are doing and how the subversive action against the South Vietnamese government is directed and supported.

by the Communist regime in Hanoi. Over the years the South Vietnamese government has tried to bring details of this picture of subversion and covert aggression to the attention of the world. Massive evidence -- over 200 letters containing details of over 1200 incidents -- has been filed with the International Control Commission. For the past four years the government in Saigon has made annual reports containing documentary evidence of Viet Cong activities and atrocities in an effort to focus world attention on the deepening tragedy of a people who, wanting only to be left alone, have become the current target of international Communism's blueprint for world conquest. The new government in Saigon has recently released additional information on North Vietnam's support for the Viet Cong guerrillas that once more makes clear that the insurgency in South Vietnam is the handiwork of international Communism, and that it is not an "internal matter" for South Vietnam as the Communists claim. (See Washington Post story in the 5 December 1963 issue of Press Comment)

The Viet Cong and the authorities in Hanoi violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Vietnam through many techniques. For example, espionage agents are introduced into the South, some traveling by fishing junks operated by the Special 603rd Maritime Unit in Dong Hoi or by other infiltration groups. Others travel south along one of the many secret infiltration trails through the demilitarized zone or through Laos. Through its clandestine channels into the South, the Viet Cong are sending not only espionage agents and military personnel but large quantities of military equipment and other supplies. In earlier days the Viet Cong were able to obtain much of their logistical support locally by "collecting taxes," outright robbery, rice seizures, ransom collections and other illegal means. As more effective defenses have been put up by the people of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong have had to rely more and more on supplies from the North.

Military Support to the Viet Cong. As far back as 1961, a unit of the South Vietnamese Army located and destroyed a Viet Cong base at Calu in the northern province of Quang Tri, a way station on an infiltration route from the north. The Vietnamese forces captured a documentary record of the Viet Cong infiltration activities, including inventories of weapons sent in over the secret trail for distribution to Viet Cong units in Quang Tri Province, in Viet Cong Zone 5, and in other areas. The following war materials were listed as having been distributed to Zone 5:

115 light machineguns and 75,054 rounds of ammunition
78 submachineguns and 26,758 rounds of ammunition
2,342 rifles and 488,388 rounds of ammunition
421 hand grenades
138 packages and 11 cases of explosives
287 cases of mines
382 cases of bombs
148 boxes of gunpowder

The following were sent in for use in Quang Tri Province:

40 light machineguns
80 submachineguns
12 pistols
308 rifles and 73,204 rounds of ammunition
24 grenade launchers
115 grenades

Supplies listed in the document for other areas were:

35 light machineguns and 3,664 rounds of ammunition
243 submachineguns and 88,314 rounds of ammunition
702 rifles and 209,274 rounds of ammunition
502 kilograms of explosives
201 cases of mines
75 cases of bombs
9 cases of gunpowder


In addition to the above materials, large quantities of medical supplies produced in the Sino-Soviet bloc have been captured from Viet Cong units. One case alone included stocks of medicines from Hungary, Bulgaria, and Communist China; there were also rubber gloves, syringes and a stethoscope from the CFR and a large collection of medical instruments as well as three medical charts marked "Printed in Peking."

International Communist support for these aggressive acts are increasing each year. Since mid-1963, the Vietnamese military forces have been capturing appreciable quantities of bloc-manufactured weapons and ammunition, nearly all of which have been identified as having originated in Communist China. Some of the captured weapons are even of recent manufacture whereas in earlier times the Viet Cong were given only the old weapons from the army of North Vietnam when those forces were re-equipped with new ones. One year ago, according to Vietnamese estimates, about 70 percent of the main Viet Cong units had machine-made weapons; that figure is now put at 100 percent. Further, the regional Viet Cong forces -- smaller units that operate at no greater than company strength -- were estimated to be 40 percent equipped with machine-made weapons and this figure is now put at 70 percent, largely because of an increase in Communist-bloc carbines that have recently come into the country. In the four provinces under the protection of the 7th Division of the South Vietnamese Army -- Long An, Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuong, and Kien Phong -- there are now four strong Viet Cong battalions. A year ago, according to South Vietnamese military estimates, these units probably included 200-250 men each, whereas they now have 450 men and heavy weapons.

These intelligence reports also calculate that 90 percent of all the weapons flowing into South Vietnam are coming through Communist China, regardless of their origin. Important Chinese Communist equipment was captured on 10 September 1963 during a Viet Cong attack on Dam Doi headquarters. Among

the weapons captured was a 75 mm recoilless rifle, the largest caliber gun thus far taken from the Viet Cong. The recovery of weapons of Chinese Communist manufacture is continuing, improved types of water mines are being picked up and there is an especially large increase in the infiltration of explosives of Chinese origin into South Vietnam. On nine different occasions during the past summer shipments of explosives -- a total of more than 16 tons, mostly potassium chlorate and potassium nitrate -- have been picked up. These are but some of the virtually countless examples and proofs that the Viet Cong activity is completely attributable to North Vietnam, acting as the agent of the International Communist Movement.

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721 AF, FE, WE, WH. Soviet Contacts with the Free World -- Post-
25X1C10b Barghoorn



BACKGROUND: Soviet Cultural Propaganda. Since Stalin's death especially, Soviet leaders have tried hard to convince the rest of the world that Russia is a center of culture and science, where everything is done for the worker. Propaganda on these lines serves in part to reassure the Soviets themselves, suffering as they do from a cultural inferiority complex. But it also assists Soviet diplomacy and Communist penetration by breaking hostility, inducing people to support Soviet political goals, and making people conscious of Soviet power. Cultural friendship is considered a first step toward political conversion -- or even toward agent recruitment. Naturally the Soviets believe that they alone should be the ones to exploit cultural propaganda. The Soviets want to use culture and "friendship" to spread their idea of "peaceful coexistence," but they reject ideological coexistence.

Exchange Visits. In recent years, exchange visits have been a favorite method for spreading the Soviet gospel in the free world. The Soviets hope that the visits abroad of their writers, artists, scientists, astronauts, exhibits will impress the outside world with the glories of Soviet society. They also hope to propagandize and convert foreign travellers and delegations visiting the Soviet Union. Person-to-person contacts can convince people (as published or broadcast propaganda never could) that Stalinism has ended in the USSR. Non-Communists find it difficult to evade a direct personal approach, and ideological barriers often seem to vanish in a direct conversation. Compared with published material or broadcasting, personal contacts reach only a few people, most often writers, artists, and scientists. But these are usually carefully-chosen key people, who will either pass their impressions on to political leaders or communicate these impressions to large audiences.

Soviet Manipulation of Exchanges. The Soviets probably overestimate the impression their dams, collective farms, and travelling exhibits make on sophisticated observers, but they make the most of what they have, and they often achieve success with those -- sometimes supposedly sophisticated -- non-Soviets who do not realize that they are seeing a mere façade. Following the general Communist practice in other fields, the Soviets make use of small but highly organized groups of activists. Aside from Intourist and Soviet diplomats, cultural organizations and friendship societies play leading roles in guiding travel and contacts both inside and outside the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET~~ (721. Continued)

Frederick C. Barghoorn, the recently arrested American scholar, is one of the leading experts on Soviet cultural exchange operations, and parts of his latest published article on this subject are contained in an attachment. (Attachment 1) Two qualifications should be made to Barghoorn's analysis:

1. Perhaps because of his then (1961) desire to retain access to the USSR himself, Barghoorn scarcely did justice to the exaggerated efforts to conceal Soviet realities: whole model farms, prisons, factories, and hotels are operated for display purposes.

2. Barghoorn's own recent experience confirms that he has had a tendency to overestimate the possibilities of free movement and conduct by westerners in the USSR. His comment at the end of his 1960 book (THE SOVIET CULTURAL OFFENSIVE), that "in traveling to the USSR even today, one cannot take as much for granted as in travel to other countries," was an understatement. (See press clippings reproduced in attachment 2 for description of experiences of other western visitors.)

We nevertheless agree with Barghoorn's statement (in Attachment 1) that "it is perhaps in the less industrialized lands that Soviet cultural diplomacy has the greatest potential for future influence."

Exchange is Still a Two-Way Street. By their nature, however, person-to-person contacts cannot be fully controlled. Obvious surveillance would defeat the purpose of the program, and the most valuable Soviet citizens for impressing sophisticated foreigners are precisely those who can think for themselves, and can listen to non-Communist ideas. There is a basic contradiction between people-to-people exchange programs and the ideological isolation and indoctrination of Soviet society. Even with all the Soviet organizations, the exchange programs tend to favor the spread of western ideas as much as they favor the spread of Soviet ones. We should not let the Barghoorn affair make us lose sight of this. (Attachment 3 to this guidance describes the problems cultural exchanges create for the Soviets.)

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723 WH, a, e. Raul Castro's Slave Labor Law

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BACKGROUND: On the evening of 12 November 1963, Cuban television and radio audiences were treated to an address by Major Raul Castro, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Armed Forces. Fidel's younger brother spoke for three hours, introducing and explaining the new Compulsory Military Service Law. He needed to do a lot of explaining, because the adoption of this measure represents a great leap forward in the total regimentation of the Cuban people.

Highlights of the new draft law: Registration will take place during December, and it is estimated that 1.5 million Cubans will register for military service. Under Article 2, all male citizens of Cuba between the ages of 17 and 45 will be required to serve for three years in the "Revolutionary Armed Forces." For purposes of the draft, age is reckoned from the first of January of the year in which the draftee is born. As actually explained by Raul Castro, this means that a person born 31 December 1947 could be drafted 1 January 1964, or the day after his sixteenth birthday. Any one who attempts to evade his military obligation will suffer "loss of liberty" for three to six years, after which he will be inducted for the regulation three-years service. After induction, the draftee will be under military discipline and will be treated in all respects like other members of the Armed Forces. According to Article 9, "Every citizen will receive during his compulsory military service his meals, training, medical attention, clothing, shoes, personal articles, and a small monthly allotment for his necessary personal expenses." Left unspecified in the law, this stipend was later fixed at seven pesos per month, approximately one tenth the average pay of a private in the regular Cuban army, or Ejercito Rebelde. Raul went to great pains to explain how the General Staff reached a decision on this figure. He had argued that a young man without a family did not need more than five pesos, but Fidel had said: "Let us give him at least seven because the price of cigarettes has gone up." Fidel had his way, even though the others present had argued that a youth of seventeen should not smoke anyway!

In view of the highly technical nature of modern warfare, the purpose of this law is obviously not to add several hundred thousand untrained draftees to the present armed effectives. (We should not forget the enormous quantity of highly sophisticated weapons that have been shipped to Cuba.) As summarized and expounded by Raul Castro, it seems to have three purposes:

- a) Primarily, to provide an abundance of cheap labor.
- b) Secondarily, to put additional thousands under military discipline without at the same time providing them with weapons.

off the street and put them to work.

Nowhere does the text of the new law refer to any but its purely military, national defense purposes. However, as if under some Freudian compulsion, Raul Castro returned frequently to these hidden aims. The armed forces, he said, have an obligation to help the economic production of the nation, therefore, . . . "we ought to work part of our service in sugarcane, to which we can devote three or four months. . . We will have other jobs to do. One of these will be coffee. Then we will have to go and pick coffee beans, the socialized coffee beans of the people, of the state, and at the same time help the entire private sector of our peasants, setting an example by our work on behalf of the consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance of our socialist revolution."

Without the least compunction, Raul Castro gives examples later in this speech of how the labor shortage in Cuba has brought about the system of "volunteer" labor brigades. Now, it seems, even this system makes the cost of coffee production prohibitive. Although the volunteers are paid on an incentive basis, at 55 centavos per tin of 28 lbs. of coffee beans gathered plus room and board, efficiency is so low that the average wage is less than one peso per day. Likewise, since rationing has vastly reduced the real value of money, many coffee pickers go along for the food and sometimes extra clothing they receive. All this, as Raul Castro put it, has required a second look at the costeabilidad of coffee growing in a socialist system. That is, he is asking: "Can we afford it?"

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724 FE,NE. The Formation of the Federation of Malaysia

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BACKGROUND: On September 16, 1963 the Federation of Malaysia came into being. This anti-Communist grouping is comprised of four Southeast Asian territories: the former Federation of Malaya, a constitutional, parliamentary monarchy; Singapore, a semi-autonomous state; and Sarawak and North Borneo, both former British Crown Colonies. The formation of Malaysia has created new controversies in the already tense situation in Southeast Asia. What is the history of the Malaysian conception and why has it aroused such emotional controversy?

Tunku Rahman Proposal: On 27 May 1961, Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman met with the Foreign Correspondents Association of Southeast Asia at a luncheon in Singapore and in informal post-luncheon remarks he said:

"Sooner or later Malaya should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is premature for me to say now how this closer understanding can be brought about, but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in political and economic cooperation."

This was not a completely new idea, but it was the first time that it had been proposed publicly. In spite of the vagueness of Tunku Rahman's proposal, concrete plans soon began to take shape. Two months later (July 1961) the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee was formed and this group of leading individuals from the five territories began to study the feasibility of the suggestion and to develop plans to reconcile conflicting local interests and requirements. Progress continued at a rapid pace and in the Autumn of 1961 the Tunku went to London to consult with the British government. On 23 November, agreement in principle was reached with Prime Minister MacMillan on the advisability of creating Malaysia. The agreement included provision for appointing a commission to determine, on the spot, the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak, and to seek the views of the Sultan of Brunei.

The Cobbold Commission (so named after its chairman, Lord Cobbold) went to Sarawak and North Borneo in February 1962 and interviewed several thousand private individuals, consulted the Legislative Councils in the two Colonies, and reviewed numerous memoranda from various groups and individuals in the territories. The Commission also visited Brunei and consulted the Sultan and his Ministers. In June 1962 the Cobbold Commission's report was completed and signed. It summarized the problems involved in setting up the federation, made a series of unanimous recommendations and included separate recommendations

by the British and the Malayan representatives. Subsequently, there were extensive negotiations on individual liberties, religious freedom, status of native peoples, education, rural improvement, finance and trade, immigration control and representation in the Federation parliament. Meanwhile, the Tunku and Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had reached agreement on the terms of a merger of Singapore and Malaya and their agreement was upheld by a referendum in Singapore in September 1962.

In July 1963, four of the territories signed the formal agreement providing for the inauguration of the Federation of Malaysia on 31 August 1963. Brunei had backed out at the last minute in a dispute over finances and issues related to the precedence of the Sultan among the new leadership.

Foreign Opposition to Malaysia: As the members of the proposed federation negotiated and it became increasingly apparent that they would succeed in coming to terms, the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines showed increasing concern and opposition. In December 1962 antagonisms and hostilities reached a critical point. The Brunei People's Party (Partai Rakjat Brunei), led by A.M. Azahari, was vigorously opposed to the formation of Malaysia. They favored the creation of a unified state consisting of North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. The Brunei People's Party under Azahari had been influential in organizing a small rebel force called the "North Borneo National Army" (TNKU). On December 8 these rebel forces attacked several towns and oil fields in Brunei and Sarawak, and attempted to seize control of the area. British troops were flown in from Singapore and by December 12 the revolt had for all effective purposes collapsed. Azahari fled to Manila and thence to Indonesia. Indonesia denied involvement although it had gone on record as supporting the objectives of the short-lived rebellion and had even covertly assisted in training some of the rebel units. In January 1963 Indonesia announced its policy of confrontation toward the formation of Malaysia. President Sukarno, of course, was the architect of this policy of menacing every aspect of the proposed federation and its supporters. When Tunku Rahman refused to be intimidated and Afro-Asian circles failed to give any meaningful support, he abandoned that policy temporarily and on 31 May staged a reconciliation with Tunku Rahman.

The Indonesian, Malayan, and Philippine foreign ministers met in Manila in June to pave the way for a meeting of their respective chiefs of state to seek a formula for agreement on the disputed issues. President Sukarno, Prime Minister Abdul Rahman, and President Macapagal then conferred in Manila in early August. Sukarno immediately made a series of demands that would have completely upset the Malaysia timetable; the Tunku refused to meet them. Their differences were mediated by President Macapagal and the stormy conference finally ended with agreement that U.N. Secretary General U Thant would be requested to make a quick assessment of whether the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak were really in favor of Malaysia.

U Thant appointed a team of nine assessors (all of the disputants approved U Thant's choices) which proceeded immediately to the area, accompanied by two Indonesians, two Malaysians, and two Filipinos who had been invited as observers. In accepting the Manila Conference's request for assistance the Secretary General made a strict condition that the findings of the U.N. team were not subject to confirmation by any of the governments concerned. On 14 September U Thant released the report of the U.N. survey team which concluded that a clear majority of the people in Sarawak and North Borneo were in favor of Malaysia. Indonesia and the Philippines contended that the U.N. survey had not been carried out in accordance with the Manila agreements and refused to recognize the new federation.

The policy of confrontation was immediately renewed and anti-Malaysian rioting -- encouraged, if not actually planned, by the Indonesian government -- took place throughout Indonesia. A mob sacked and burned the British Embassy in Djakarta on 18 September and almost all other British and Malayan diplomatic and privately owned property was systematically looted and burned. Indonesia cut off commercial and communications links with Malaysia and sent additional combat ready troops to the borders of Sarawak and North Borneo. With the passage of time, the more frantic and delirious aspects of Indonesia's confrontation policy have subsided somewhat but the basic hostility remains, primarily in the form of the economic boycott of Malaysia and the support and training of anti-Malaysian guerrillas in Borneo. The Philippine government has recently modified its position considerably and has even shown signs that it may recognize Malaysia if it can be done gracefully.

Reasons for Indonesian Hostility: Throughout the dispute over the formation of the Malaysian Federation, Indonesia has cited two main contentions for its opposition to the Federation: First, it is an instrument of Great Britain and a tool for continuing British colonialism in Southeast Asia. Second, it is too small and weak to withstand pressure and the threat of being taken over by the Chinese Communists. A third factor in the dispute is that Sukarno feels, and indeed has said, that the forces behind the formation of Malaysia think they can settle matters that concern Indonesia without even consulting Indonesia and that they must be taught otherwise. It is generally conceded that the latter factor is an important one, perhaps the important one and that Sukarno has not been able to conceal his own aspirations to see an Indonesian empire stretch from Malaya to the northern tip of the Philippine Islands

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Attachment #1

CULTURAL EXCHANGE

Almost immediately after the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953, his successors proclaimed that they favored the "free development of contacts" between the Soviet Union and all other countries. Partly in response to the Soviet "cultural offensive" the term "cultural diplomacy" came into increasing use in the West to describe exchanges of persons, particularly those of scientific eminence, and of cultural materials, conducted with political objectives or at least with an awareness of their possible political consequences.

In terms of human and financial resources involved, the effort with which we are here concerned represents a new dimension of the Kremlin's diplomacy and propaganda. In its ultimate purposes, however, it is squarely in the revolutionary Lenin tradition which Khrushchev sought to revive after his discrediting of Stalinism in 1956. It also bears many marks of the heritage of Stalin, who himself, especially before the great purges of 1936-38, was an energetic practitioner of cultural diplomacy.

Many of Stalin's actions reflected his belief that the display of Soviet achievements to foreign visitors in the USSR, or to all who were interested abroad, was of great political significance. He often interrupted his busy schedule to play host to delegations of labor leaders, artistic and literary figures, and other foreign notables. Not infrequently he took the trouble to receive individually such personages as H.G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw, Emil Ludwig, Lion Feuchtwanger, and many others. In a statement to the 14th Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1928 Stalin revealed a basic motive for this policy. He told the Congress that visits of groups from India, Egypt, and China, as well as of delegations of workers from the W., constituted "the best, most forceful and active propaganda for the Soviet system against the capitalist system." In a somewhat similar vein, Khrushchev, during his visit to the United States in Sept. 1959, professed a desire for "the broadest possible cultural and scientific exchange" between Russia and America, and linked such exchange to peaceful competition between rival social systems.

In 1925, VOKS, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, was established. In Feb. 1958, VOKS dissolved itself and was replaced by the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with foreign Countries. Although Soviet sources stated that the methods employed by VOKS had become outmoded, there appears to be no essential difference between its activities and those of its successor organization which, like VOKE, is officially described as a "voluntary, public organization" and is carefully distinguished in Soviet terminology from such state agencies as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, established in 1957. Like VOKS, the Union of Friendship Societies operates mainly on a nominally nongovernmental level. It invites artistic, literary, and sometimes, scientific delegations to visit the USSR and arranges for formal meetings between such groups and

Soviet colleagues. It also is active in the dissemination of Soviet publications to foreign scholars and intellectuals.

The State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, to the chairmanship of which Georgy A. Zhukov, former Pravda foreign editor, was appointed upon its establishment, played a major role in Khrushchev's expansion of cultural diplomacy. The State Committee has negotiated a number of cultural agreements and treaties with foreign countries, including the United Kingdom (1959), the German Federal Republic, India, France, the United Arab Republic, and Afghanistan. Of particular interest to Americans is the United States-Soviet Agreement on Educational, Scientific and Cultural Exchanges, signed in Jan. 1953, and extended for two years in Dec. 1959. In addition to negotiating over-all agreements, the State Committee takes a hand in negotiation of important individual cultural exchanges, working often with other Soviet agencies, such as the Ministry of Culture.

Another organization which plays an important part in the Soviet system of guided culture contact is Intourist, the official tourist agency. Founded in 1923, as one of several Soviet-style "joint stock" companies, and still so organized, Intourist had, as of 1957, some five thousand employees, according to an article in the Soviet English language magazine for Americans, USSR. Its staff has probably grown considerably since then, if one can assume some proportionality between its size and the swelling dimensions of tourist travel to the USSR. In the case of the United States, for example, about 2,500 tourists visited the Soviet Union in 1956, while estimates for 1960 were in the neighborhood of 25,000. With its network of hotels and restaurants and its staffs of interpreters, chauffeurs, and so forth, Intourist has shepherded and guided, served, helped, and sometimes obstructed thousands of foreign tourists, teachers, students, businessmen, and others who have over the years come to the "land of socialism" to observe, to marvel, or to compare impressions based on printed sources with whatever aspects of Soviet reality they were able to see and appraise for themselves. Most foreign visitors to Russia, with the exception of such categories as diplomats and journalists on long-term assignments, must use the facilities of Intourist by virtue of its monopoly control over indispensable services. With the recovery of the Soviet economy from the effects of World War II and the partial reopening of the USSR to foreign contact that followed Stalin's death, the services of Intourist were expanded and improved. However, it is fair to say that the Soviet system of official tourism of which Intourist is a part still serves to render travel in Russia highly restricted by free world standards. The consequences of this situation, in terms of concealing aspects of Soviet life which the Kremlin does not wish to disclose, are of course significant if, as is usually the case, foreign visitors do not have a working knowledge of the Russian language.

The main professed purpose of Soviet culture exchange policy has always been the "struggle for peace." For example, Nikolay Mikhaylov, Soviet minister of culture, wrote in Pravda for

April 2, 1956, that "the development of cultural relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain will undoubtedly contribute to the noble aims, common to both peoples, of consolidating peace." It is significant also that the post-Stalin cultural campaign was launched in June 1953, at the Budapest meeting of the major international communist-front organization, the World Peace Council, which has continued to coordinate its activities with those of the Soviet cultural apparatus. This aspect of Soviet cultural diplomacy appears to be intended to strengthen the desired image of the USSR and the Soviet bloc in general as champions of peace, while at the same time casting the United States in the role of chief warmonger. Furtherance of Soviet disarmament policy and hindrance of American defense efforts are corollary themes of much of the Soviet propaganda disseminated in connection with major Communist cultural exchange projects, such as the mammoth Moscow Festival of Youth and Students (1957) and the next in this series, held in Vienna in 1959....

Although Moscow has devoted less of its cultural resources to the underdeveloped countries than to W. Europe and the United States, it is perhaps in the less industrialized lands that Soviet cultural diplomacy has the greatest potential for future influence. Africa and Latin America have not been neglected by the Kremlin cultural strategists. Beginning in 1955 the Soviet authorities undertook a revival of Oriental studies which led to development of a substantial, growing program of teaching and research on the history, languages and literatures, and the economic and political conditions of the peoples of the non-industrialized countries. At both the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 and the Extraordinary 21st Congress in 1959 such top-ranking party Presidium members as, respectively, Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov demanded that Soviet scholars produce works which would be useful in carrying the Soviet message to these areas.

The visit by Nikita S. Khrushchev and Nikolay Bulganin to India, Burma, and Afghanistan in 1955 and Khrushchev's visit in 1959 to Indonesia and other S. E. Asian countries, again including India and Afghanistan, lent impetus to Soviet efforts at cultural penetration in these and neighboring countries. Mikoyan's visits and speech-making in Mexico and Cuba in 1959 reminded North Americans that the Soviet Union did not intend to refrain from persuasion and subversion in the W. hemisphere. A significant move, which may for some time be difficult to evaluate, was taken in 1960 when Khrushchev announced in Indonesia that the Soviet government had decided to open, in Moscow, a special Peoples' Friendship University...primarily for students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. According to Sovetskaya Kultura (Soviet Culture), the newspaper of the Ministry of Culture, for Feb. 25, 1960, the new university was to be under the joint sponsorship of the "Soviet Committee for Solidarity of the Countries of Asia and Africa," the already-mentioned Union of Friendship Societies, and the All-Union Council of Trade Unions.

Attachment #3

Pitfalls of Cultural Exchange for the Soviets

The recent arrest of the American Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn showed that, even today, visitors to the USSR are not immune from arbitrary arrest and detention. Clearly there was no real case against Barghoorn, and it is profitable to speculate as to why he was arrested. One possible reason may have been a desire by Soviet security and espionage authorities to exchange him for a Soviet trading organization employee recently caught in flagrante delicto at a New Jersey railroad station. Another, but almost totally improbable, explanation might be that there was an excess of zeal on the part of some very junior secret police officer. But there is still another hypothesis, which we find much more likely: Barghoorn may well have been arrested to discourage both western visitors and Soviet citizens from too much unsupervised personal contact with each other.

In recent years, the Soviets have engaged in a very active program of cultural exchange, with stress on travel both to and from the Soviet Union. Personal contacts can, under proper conditions, be a very fruitful means of breaking down western suspicion. We may be unable to bear the cliches of Radio Moscow, but we will believe assurances of peaceful intentions from individual Soviet citizens, who doubtless offer them in all sincerity. Many non-Communists return from the Soviet Union impressed by Soviet accomplishments; if they are unsophisticated they may not realize how carefully they have been guided and shepherded from one model factory to another. As it happens, Professor Barghoorn was perhaps the leading American expert on the organization and methods used in the Soviet cultural exchange program. He knew the techniques, and warned people against them. But he also knew that, despite the Soviet intention, cultural exchange is bound to work in two directions. Plants raised in an ideological hothouse may be more sensitive than those which have grown wild in an open environment.

The operators of the Soviet cultural exchange program have problems. If they keep all foreign tourists under strict surveillance, and permit only hardened Communist "activists" to travel abroad, they will convince the rest of the world that things are just as they were under Stalin. On the other hand, if they send Soviet intellectuals to meet foreigners, or allow foreign visitors to converse freely with Soviet citizens, there is an exposure to non-Communist ideology. The most valuable Soviet citizens for creating favorable impressions are precisely those who can think for themselves, and who are ready--when they have a chance--to voice independent thoughts. Many non-Communist visitors to the USSR are by no means stupid, easily fooled, or inarticulate. No doubt some Soviet officials are ready to "take a chance" while others--for example, those who engineered Professor Barghoorn's arrest--want to "play safe." Professor Barghoorn seems to have underestimated the influence of the latter group; on the other hand, his release shows the importance of the former element. The Soviet Union has gone too far to turn back to uninhibited Stalinism, but if foreign contacts are permitted to

continue, Soviet society itself is bound to be affected.

Soviet Visitors Abroad. In regard to Soviet visitors abroad, the problems are shown by the regime's experiences a year ago with Viktor Nekrasov and Yevgeny Yevtushenko. Nekrasov is a Ukrainian writer who in November 1962 published an article in the Soviet "liberal" literary journal Novy Mir (New World), describing his experiences in Italy and the US. In this article, Nekrasov wrote relatively little about the superiority of Soviet communism over capitalism, and many of his remarks were likely to give Soviet readers a favorable impression of the countries visited. Nekrasov ventured to criticize the busybody activities of the secret police chaperon accompanying his group, and the writer also seized an opportunity to criticize the Soviet propaganda film cliché of the "old worker with the graying moustaches who understands all and has a precise and clear answer for everything." In the Spring of 1963, Yevtushenko, after conducting propaganda tours through Europe, selling the idea of the "new" Soviet Union, published his autobiography serially in a Paris weekly, L'Express; in the process, he exposed Soviet anti-semitism and conformism. Nekrasov was the more serious transgressor, and having failed to retract, he was (according to unconfirmed reports) expelled from the CPSU last summer. Khrushchev and other worthies publicly criticized Yevtushenko who, unlike Nekrasov, exercised self-criticism. The Soviets have had other unfortunate experiences, as with Rudolf Nureyev, the ballet dancer who defected in Paris, or Vladimir Ashkenazy, the pianist who hesitated for long to return home.

Visitors in the Soviet Union... In the case of foreign travel to the USSR, the problems are exemplified by the case of the English philosopher, A.J. Ayer. Western intellectual circles know Ayer as the leading exponent of the skeptical tradition stemming from David Hume, and also as an extremely effective writer and speaker. In his younger days, he was a forceful advocate of the Viennese philosophy of logical positivism, which was hostile to vague metaphysical formulas, and which only assigned value to those statements which could be verified empirically. Thus, unlike say Jean-Paul Sartre, Ayer's philosophical sympathies are poles apart from the Hegelian-Marxist tradition. The Soviet philosophical journal Voprosy Filosofii (Problems of Philosophy) broke all precedents by soliciting and (in January 1962) publishing an article by Ayer. In Ayer's words, his article "contained a mild criticism of Marxist dialectics. I argued that whatever other purposes they might serve, the principles of the dialectics were not scientific laws. My suggestion was not that they were false, but that since they were interpreted in such a way that nothing could conceivably refute them, they had no empirical content." The article was preceded by an editorial note, explaining that Ayer did not understand the dialectic, and was followed by a long rejoinder, defending Marxism's claim to be scientific. But it was surprising that Ayer's article should be published at all. Evidently, the explanation was that the Soviets hoped to enlist Ayer (who stands to the Left in British politics, and who had met with Soviet philosophers at a world congress) in the Soviet peace

campaign. After the article was accepted, but before it appeared, Soviet philosophers also invited Ayer to the USSR, where he gave lectures on British and American philosophy at Moscow and Leningrad. The bubble burst when Ayer published an article in the London Observer (3 April 1962), describing his experience, gently ridiculing orthodox Marxist philosophy, mentioning the extreme interest of Soviet students in his non-Marxist views, and concluding that revisionism was a growing force. It was now obvious that, instead of influencing Ayer, Ayer was influencing Soviet youth. Kommunist, the official ideological journal, published a scathing attack, aimed more at the editors of Voprosy Filosofii than at Ayer, and Voprosy Filosofii tried to recover its ideological stature with two further rebuttals to Ayer.

Dilemma Faces Soviets. Despite the pitfalls of foreign contacts, despite the fact that these contacts undermine Soviet ideology, the Soviets cannot give up cultural and other exchanges without stultifying their own political propaganda on "peaceful coexistence" and a "liberalized" Soviet Union. Notwithstanding the Nekrasov, Yevtushenko, and Ashkanazy experiences, Novy Mir is to publish new Nekrasov works next year; Ashkanazy was allowed to make a concert tour to Iceland in June; and Ilya Glazunov (a Modernist painter) and Aleksandr Tvardovsky (editor of Novy Mir) were permitted to go to Italy last spring. (The tour to Iceland may have been intended to erase the impression left by the Ragnar Gunnarsson espionage case there last February; the visits to Italy were probably designed to undercut Italian criticism--some of it Communist--of Soviet cultural repression.) Again, one of the reasons for Barghoorn's release was probably the threat that further unwarranted detention would have posed to cultural exchange and to the Soviet image abroad. In a related area, the general cultural repression which seemed imminent last spring now seems to be partly reversed. Unfortunately, there is never any guarantee for Soviet cultural freedom, but slowly, with occasional setbacks, freedom seems to be gaining ground. The Soviet leaders are caught in a trap of their own making.

Soviet Subversion In The Congo

In November 1960 Communist leaders from eighty-one countries, gathered in Moscow, issued a statement which said, inter alia:

The socialist countries are true and sincere friends of the peoples fighting for liberation and of those who have thrown off the imperialist yoke. While rejecting on principle any interference in the internal affairs of young national states, they consider it their internationalist duty to help the peoples in strengthening their independence.... The socialist system has become a reliable shield for the independent national development of the peoples who have won freedom.... Communists have always recognized the progressive, revolutionary significance of national liberation wars; they are the most active champions of national independence.

These pious words were uttered two months after Soviet and Czechoslovak diplomatic personnel had been expelled from Leopoldville for brazenly defying General Mobutu's government by supporting Antoine Gizenga's efforts to take over the premiership, and just three years before the Soviets were again to be declared personae non gratae for conspiring to overthrow the lawful Congolese government of Premier Cyrille Adoula.

When they were readmitted to the Republic of the Congo in September 1962, Soviet Ambassador Serge S. Nemchina said, in part:

The Soviet Union, faithful to the policy of peaceful coexistence, desires to develop its relationship with the Republic of the Congo on the basis of equality of rights, mutual respect of sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. The Republic of the Congo can be assured that the Soviet Union is its faithful friend who does not look for special privileges for itself, does not make conditions which might prejudice the sovereignty of other states and does not pursue any interested aim in its relations with other countries.

The hypocrisy of these easy words became clear just fourteen months later when two members of Ambassador Nemchina's staff were arrested and documentary evidence of subversive activities was found on their persons after they had refused to prove diplomatic immunity from search. The two "diplomats," Boris Voronin, embassy counselor and Yuri Myakotnykh, press attache, were returning by ferry from Brazzaville, capital of neighboring Congo Republic (formerly French Congo) and center for disgruntled opposition political elements from Leopoldville who are plotting the overthrow of Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula's government. Radio Congo said that certain diplomats had been "shadowed for some time and were suspected of leading subversive activities under cover of diplomatic immunity."

Among the incriminating documents (subsequently released by the Congolese government) were two which proved direct Soviet encouragement and support of the Brazzaville plotters. One, dated 13 November 1963, was signed by Christophe Gbenye, a follower of the late Patrice Lumumba. It describes the organization of the National Liberation Committee (NLC), of which Gbenye is president, and the various political party components which comprise it and discusses disagreements among members over the question of whether China or Russia will be most helpful to their cause. The NLC goal, according to the report, is:

to take revolutionary and armed action in order to liberate the Congo from the bands of the imperialists, the neo-colonialists and their agents....It was agreed that Comrade Gbenye...would direct the action beyond the borders while Comrades Lubaya and Assumani would direct the operations within the country.

After further discussion of organizational and personnel problems, the document closes with a list of "Measures to be Taken" which includes "The Russian comrades should send us before 25 November 1963 two portable radio transmitters for our activities"; "the USSR to print money for us in order to better conduct the struggle." It requests various items of espionage equipment, from recorders and photo copying apparatus to silent pistols and double-bottom suitcases. Also included is a request that an NLC mission to China be facilitated. Attached to the document, type-written in French, was a handwritten note addressed to "Comrade Oleg," believed to be Oleg I. Nazhestkin, attache, who has been active in support of the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor in the Congo.

A second document which the Soviets carried back to Leopoldville was dated 16 November 1963, written over the name of B. L. Lukunku and entitled "Activities in the Interior." Elaborating on the difficulties the various "progressive parties" are having in working together as the NLC, the report also discussed Communist China's agreement to train 200 military cadres and closed with a similar, though somewhat less ambitious, list of needed equipment and "2,000 \$" -- implicitly addressed to the Soviet Union. As a more personal afterthought the writer added his insistence that a certain individual be sent immediately to the "union sovietique" where he holds a scholarship.

Government response. Some Congolese officials had urged earlier that relations with the Communist bloc be broken because of their aid in plots to overthrow the government. Following this final, irrefutable proof of flagrant interference in Congolese affairs, the Government announced that all members of the Soviet mission were personnae non gratae. All, including the arrested Voronin and Myakotnykh left Leopoldville although a formal diplomatic break did not take place. Thus for the second time in thirty-eight months -- and unbelievable as it may seem -- the Soviet Union's representatives had been discovered in

subversive acts which led to their expulsion from the Congo.

Communist subversion has many facets. The Communist powers, despite their much vaunted support for national liberation movements, have respected independence and government sovereignty only in their propaganda. While promising non-interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, they were conspiring with and giving material and financial support to a plot to overthrow the elected government. But their techniques have not been limited to this type of plot, nor have they ignored other countries. Five Bulgarian diplomats and one East German trade mission official, for example, were expelled from Iraq on July 22, 1963 following a crude, Communist-supported uprising against the government which had earlier ousted pro-Communist Premier Kassem. The attempted coup brought to light a widespread and well-financed agent and propaganda network run by the First Secretary of the Bulgarian Embassy. The Republic of Guinea, on gaining independence from France, gladly accepted Soviet aid and training assistance. But they soon found the Soviet technicians inefficient (perhaps because espionage and subversion assignments kept them so busy), their equipment of poor quality and their diplomats openly inciting Guinean teachers against Sekou Toure's government. In December 1961 the Guinea government declared Soviet Ambassador Solod persona non grata.

The largest front group in the developing countries, the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, which ostensibly speaks in the name of Afro-Asian peoples, was unmasked at the February 1963 conference when the Chinese Communists made a dramatic effort to outbid the Soviet delegates for control of the conference. Massive Communist campaigns to subvert the peoples of Africa as well as those of new countries elsewhere include the recruitment and support of students in Moscow and other bloc cities (where the number of foreign students has nearly trebled since 1960) in an effort to influence or, better still, control key figures in ruling circles of the future. Propaganda is carried on through a monumental publishing program in the bloc and international broadcasts in the native tongues of countries throughout the world. Propaganda organs of the Communist countries, the Communist parties and the front groups work unceasingly against independence and non-alignment, despite the fact that their deeds continue to belie their words.

BACKGROUND TO THE BARGHOORN RELEASE

Russians distrust experts who know them too well

By Ronald Hingley, University Lecturer in Russian and Research Fellow of St. ANTONY'S COLLEGE, OXFORD

CPYRGHT

The arrest in Moscow on espionage charges of Professor Barghoorn, chairman of Soviet Studies Department at Yale University, is the climax to a series of discriminatory actions by the Russian authorities against visitors who specialise in Soviet affairs.

Many have had their notebooks confiscated or have been subjected to search, bullying and prolonged interrogation on the frontiers and elsewhere. Even Intourist officials have taken to summoning these visitors, and have tried to intimidate them by accusing them of "ideological reconnaissance."

Two glaring instances of this treatment are reported below by Evelyn Irons from New York.

While discriminating in this way against the experts, the authori-

ties have been behaving more and more pleasantly to well-meaning laymen from Western countries, some of whom can be primed with the special handouts for regurgitation on return to their own countries.

It seems almost as if the Russians have decided to nullify the academic exchange scheme which they operate with the Western countries. This has been built up with much difficulty over the last few years and has enabled the Russian students and professors to spend extended study periods in Britain, France and America.

If Moscow does want to wreck this scheme, from which both sides are benefiting, the only reason must be that the reactionary elements among policy makers are becoming concerned by the increase in the number of Western

citizens who speak Russian and now know something about conditions in the U.S.S.R.

Speaking as a colleague of Professor Barghoorn, I can say that the suggestion that he was spying is utterly grotesque. It is obvious that a person so conspicuous—a distinguished authority on Russian affairs who is known to have worked for the State Department for years—would have little hope of gathering intelligence on Soviet territory.

But espionage in the Soviet sense so often means no more than taking an interest in the world around one. Any foreigner who is not deaf, blind, dumb and half-witted is a sort of "spy" the moment the authorities decide to treat him as such. So what has happened to Professor Barghoorn could easily have happened to anyone else in the field of Russian studies.

Woman writer: 'I was harassed'

CPYRGHT

By Evelyn Irons, New York, Saturday

The only thing that surprised Miss Priscilla Johnson, an expert on Russia, about the arrest of Professor Barghoorn was that the Russians picked on a scholar of such eminence.

Miss Johnson is a freelance writer who has lived for two years in Russia, was a translator for Reuters and visited Russia twice previously, the last in September, 1962, on an assignment for "The Reporter" magazine.

She was not actually arrested, but she was accused of "intellectual espionage" which she regarded as an attempt at provoc-

ation, followed everywhere she went and finally sent home a fortnight before the expiration of her six-week visa.

All her papers, including 18 notebooks and two manuscripts, were impounded before she left Leningrad Airport.

"The trouble started in Moscow when I attended a poetry reading by Yevtushenko," Miss Johnson told me at Cambridge, Massachusetts, where she lives.

"With another Russian-speaking American, Patricia Blake, author of two books on Russian literature, I returned to my hotel by bus. We were followed by a carload

of nine men. After that I was harassed constantly. I was even prevented from visiting such places as the Ceramics Institute and the Architectural Institute. Official interviews were refused.

"If I attempted to meet Russian friends I was followed openly or surreptitiously. An Intourist man wanted to know why I didn't 'do' the Kremlin like every other tourist, although he must have known that I wasn't a first-time visitor."

Wanted to move

Miss Blake, said Miss Johnson, was summoned by secret police and told that unless she "behaved herself" she must leave the country at once. The officer uttering this threat made it clear that he had detailed knowledge of her writings.

Miss Johnson realised that with all this surveillance she was completely hamstrung. It would be dangerous for her contacts if she tried to see them. Every project was negated. "I couldn't move," she complained.

At Leningrad Airport officials who impounded her writings also confiscated cuttings from Russian less items as a report of a

Daily Telegraph, London
18 November 1963

CPYRGHT

"DRUGGED" ON RUSSIAN VISIT

Woman tells of hotel experience

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An English woman, Miss

after a tour of Siberia, she flew to Georgia with a woman friend.

They went to the opera in Tiflis and two men spoke to them. "One was a Georgian and the other a short man, who we thought came from Moscow. They lent us opera glasses.

"Bitter wine"

"They escorted us back to our hotel and they gave us some wine and then he said we should have the local wine. The wine

(Trazos del discurso sobre la Ley del Servicio Militar Obligatorio que pronunció Raúl Castro el 12 de noviembre de 1963.)

Como nosotros consideramos que las Fuerzas Armadas deben ayudar a la producción, al desarrollo económico del país, a hacer en una pañabra un poquito más ligera la carga que nuestro pueblo representa — los gastos que las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias ocasionan — debemos trabajar una parte de nuestro servicio, primero en la caña, a la que podemos dedicarle tres o cuatro meses de trabajo... Es decir, teniendo en cuenta que debemos tener algunos en reserva con máxima disposición combativa, que no vayan a sorprendernos a todos un día cortando caña. Cuando llegue el momento oportuno — es posible y no lejano — de la mecanización de la parte agrícola de la caña, del azúcar, nos quedarán otras tareas que realizar. Una de ellas la del café. Tendremos entonces que ir a recoger el café, el café socializado del pueblo, estatal, y a su vez ayudar en la recogida a todo el sector de nuestros campesinos, contribuyendo con el trabajo a la consolidación de la alianza obrera-campesina de nuestra Revolución Socialista.

Capítulo 5 (De la inscripción, selección y presentación). Artículo 16: Todo ciudadano durante el año en que cumpla dieciséis años de edad se inscribirá en la oficina de inscripción en cuya jurisdicción se encuentra su domicilio, la que le expedirá un comprobante de su inscripción. O sea, se inscribirán en el año en que cumplen dieciséis. Durante el año en que cumplen dieciséis años de edad. Y se llaman al servicio durante el año en que cumplen diecisiete. Es posible que nos encontremos con un caso de un muchacho que cumple dieciséis el 30 de diciembre. Prácticamente se inscribe con quince años. Unos días después cumple dieciséis. Será llamado al año siguiente, como cumple diecisiete en diciembre, tal vez. Puede presentarse el caso que sea llamado antes.

Lo que en Cuba se hace fundamentalmente es para las generaciones del futuro, para la actual juventud. ¿Y quién mejor que ella para cuidar, contribuir a su desarrollo, y proteger, en una palabra, su porvenir, el porvenir de sus hijos, y de los hijos de sus hijos -- el porvenir además de toda la nación?

La Ley del Servicio Militar Obligatorio se utilizará también para ayudar a eliminar todo ese elemento señalado anteriormente -- los lumpen /harapientos: voz empleada mucho por los Castro, se supone adoptada del concepto marxista Lumpenproletariat /, los vagos, etc., gente que vive en este país y que no trabaja. No vive del aire: vive de algo. Y ese algo es lo que producen los demás. Ahora bien, la Ley del Servicio Militar va a acabar con los vagos. Simultáneamente, una gran cantidad de personas que se manifestaban seguidamente decían: "Pero vengan acá: ustedes no van a dar las armas a los vagos, a los lumpen, los gusanos, los batisblanca, a esa gente que hay que recoger por ahí." Y naturalmente no se las vamos a dar. Vamos a colaborar a acabar con los vagos, y no acabar exterminándolos, sino acabar ayudándolos, rehabilitándolos con trabajo especial que vamos a hacer para ellos. Que nadie con dos dedos de frente vaya a pensar que la Ley del Servicio Militar se hizo para acabar con los vagos. Porque si damos las armas a los vagos, acaban con la Revolución.

Since we feel that the armed forces ought to help in the production, in the economic development of the country, in a word to ease ever so slightly the burden which the people represent, the expenses which the Revolutionary Armed Forces cause..., we ought to work a part of our service, first in sugar cane, to which we can devote three or four months of labor. That is, taking into account the fact that we must keep some units in reserve in a maximum state of combat readiness, so we won't all be caught some day out cutting cane. When the time comes -- and it is possible and not far distant -- for the mechanization of the agricultural part of the sugar industry, we will still have other tasks to perform. One of them is coffee. We will have to go and pick coffee, the socialized coffee beans of the people, of the state, and at the same time help the entire private sector of the peasants, contributing with our work to the consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance of our socialist revolution.

Chapter 5: Registration, selection, presentation. Article 16: Each citizen will register during the year in which he becomes 16 years old in the registration office in whose jurisdiction his domicile is located.. He will be given a certificate of registration. In other words, they will register during the year in which they become 16 years old. And they will be called into service during the year in which they become 17. We may find ourselves with the case of a boy, of a young man, who becomes 16 on December 30th. For all practical purposes, he has to register when he is 15 years old. He will be 16 in a few days. He may be called up the following year, since he becomes 17 in December. It is possible he may even be called up sooner.

What we are doing in Cuba is, fundamentally, for the generations of the future, for the youth of today. And who better than the youth of today to look after, to protect, in a word, to contribute to their future, to the future of their children, the future of their children's children, -- the future of the nation?

The Compulsory Military Service Law will also be used to help to eliminate all those elements pointed out earlier: ragamuffins, tramps, vagrants, etc., people who live in this country and who do not work. They do not live on air. They live on something. And that something is what other people produce. So, the Military Service Law is going to do away with vagrants. But a great number of people have frequently expressed their opinion on this matter, saying: "But, see here, you aren't going to give arms to vagrants, to ragamuffins, to worms, to Batisblanca (religious order), to all those people that should be rounded up, are you?" Of course we are not going to give them arms. We are going to put an end to vagrants, not by exterminating them, but rather by aiding them, by rehabilitating them with special work that we are going to arrange for them. Nobody with half a brain is going to think that the Military Service Law was devised for the purpose of getting rid of vagrants. If we give arms to the vagrants, they will put up a good fight.